

Tonschwingungen erregbar? [A theoretical discussion on the basis of the experiments of Scripture, Cross and Goodwin, König, Ewald, &c. Either one must retain the doctrine of specific energy, and give up the resonance-hypothesis; or reject the former, and keep the latter in an expanded form. Adopting the second alternative, we have two paths of conduction: tympanic membrane, ossicles, labyrinth-fluid, organ of Corti: and bones of the head, terminal brushes of the cochlearis (lying in bony canals), nerve.] W. Wundt—Chronograph und Chronoscop. [Answer to a criticism of the writer's Chronograph, published by Prof. Cattell.] W. Wundt—Notiz über psychologische Apparate. [A timely note as to the guarantee of the Leipzig instruments.]

ZEITSCHR. F. PSYCH. U. PHYS. D. SINNESORGANE.—Bd. iv., Heft 6. Dr. Ziem—Das Tapetum lucidum bei Durchleuchtung des Auges. [Observations on the cat's eye. Cf. Virchow's *Archiv.*, cxxvi., 487; *Deutsche med. Wochenschr.*, 1892]. G. E. Müller—Berichtigung zu Prof. Münsterberg's Beiträgen zur experimentellen psychologie, Heft 4. Litteraturbericht. Bibliographie der psychophysiologischen Litteratur des Jahres, 1891. Bd. v., Hefte 1, 2. F. Hillebrand—Die Stabilität der Raumwerte auf der Netzhaut. [The third dimensional localisation of a binocularly fixated point is not determined by the stimulus (retinal image), but by convergence *plus* a number of variable empirical moments. The localisation of all other points, seen single in binocular vision, depends on the disparity of the retinal images, and is therefore given in the primitive sensation (p. 6.) Localisation in reference to the nuclear plane (p. 10) is conditioned only by breadth, not by height-disparity. The space-value of two points on the two retinæ, which are so related that the corresponding simple object of vision lies on the nuclear plane, is stable. The position of the visual object does not as a rule coincide with the position of the actual object (law of disparate third-dimensional localisation). The article is important.] F. Brentano—Über ein optisches Paradoxon, ii. [A reply to Lipps' criticism (iii., 498.) Whether one accept either or neither of the proffered explanations, one must admit that the methodology of this controversy is correct.] Versammlungen. Litteraturbericht.

VIERTJAHRESSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE.—xvii. Jahrgang, Heft 2. J. Petzoldt—Einiges zur Grundlegung der Sittenlehre. [An interesting exposition and criticism of F. Staudinger's system of Ethics, as contained in his book "Die Gesetze der Freiheit". Staudinger holds that the word "ought" always refers to some presupposed end. What ought to be done is what has to be done if the end is to be realised. The "moral ought" refers to an ultimate and unconditional end. This can only be found in the union of all other ends in a harmonious system. This is the supreme end because it is the supreme means. In the case of rational beings the fullest realisation of their desires depends on inward harmony of these desires with each other. Thus the mere fact that such a being seeks any ends at all places him under an obligation to seek this end. Staudinger regards want of inward harmony as invariably consisting in some kind of contradictory relation between ideas. This is the point with which Petzoldt's adverse criticism is concerned. He prefers to the conception of contradiction that of relative incompleteness and instability, and refers to Avenarius' "Kritik der Reinen Erfahrung".] P. Barth—Kritik der Grundanschauungen der Sociologie H. Spencer's. [Examines Spencer's treatment of the analogy between society and an organism. Spencer is charged with inadequate working out of the points of

agreement and with substantial failure to work out the points of difference. Above all he is taken to task for his neglect of the "apperceptive" as distinguished from the merely "associative" stages of social union. In its "apperceptive" or civilised phase society not only exists but is conscious of itself and endeavours with open eyes to determine its own condition and progress.] Chr. Ehrenfels—*Werththeorie und Ethik*, 2^{te} Art. [An elaborate investigation of the conditions which produce changes in "feeling-disposition" and consequent changes in valuation of objects both in the individual and in communities. This article is well worth reading.]

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE UND PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK.—Heft 102^a.—A. Wreschner—Ernst Platner's und Kant's Erkenntnistheorie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung von Tetens und Aenesidemus. [Considers the modifications produced by Kantian influence and by that of Tetens and Aenesidemus in the views of Platner concerning the "objectivity" and validity of knowledge, as shown by comparison of the first, second, and third editions of the "Aphorisms". The examination is careful and detailed. The general result is that Platner owing to the influences referred to developed in a sceptical direction so that in his 3rd edition he renounces the endeavour after "objective" truth and claims only subjective and relative certitude. But he regarded this kind of certitude as attainable not only within the sphere of sensible experience, but also in metaphysical inquiries concerning the soul and God]. Johannes Volkelt—*Psychologische Streitfragen*. [Opposes the following doctrines expounded by P. Natorp in his "Einleitung in die Psychologie nach Kritischer Methode". (1) That the "form of consciousness" as distinguished from its content is not a possible object of knowledge; (2) that this "form" is incapable of qualitative or intensive variations; (3) that pure Psychology cannot be an explanatory science, because, to objectify the contents of consciousness is *ex ipso* to transform them into physical facts; (4) that the only possible "Natural science of psychology" is that which refers states of consciousness to their physiological conditions; (5) that the only function of pure psychology is to trace by analysis of objective cognition the subjective data or immediate contents of consciousness which it presupposes. Ludwig Busse—Zu Kant's Lehre vom Ding an sich. Recensionen, &c.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EXAKTE PHILOSOPHIE.—Bd. xix., Heft iv.—O. Flügel ueber Gefühl und Affekt. [Defends the Herbartian doctrine that feeling has its source in the interaction of presentations from misconceptions on the part of Wundt; but the greater part of the article is devoted to emphasising the distinction between feeling on the one hand and those disturbances of mental equilibrium which are called in a special sense emotions. C. Lange's confusion on this point is noted.] O. Flügel—Über Ziehen's physiologische Psychologie. [Discusses among other points Ziehen's separation of the seat of sensations and the seat of memories, his denial of unconscious mental process, his doctrine of will, and his general view of the relation of body and mind. Besprechungen.]

REVISTA ITALIANA DI FILOSOFIA.—March and April, 1893. E. Passamonti—Giulio Cesare Vanini. F. Bonatelli—Intorno al Giudizio negativo. F. Puglia—Necessita di profondi studi psicologici per lo sviluppo della filosofia del diritto. N. Fornelli—Missione educatrice dell' Università, i. Bibliografia, &c. May and June—G. Dandolo La Dottrina della Memoria in Cartesio, Malebranche, et Spinoza. G. Mantovani—La psicologia come Scienza sperimentale. A. Valdarnini—Un nuovo Trattato di Filosofia della Natura. N. R. D'Alfonso—Lo Spettro dell' Amleto. Bibliografia, &c.